György BODÓ Ph.D Student (gyorgy.bodo@yahoo.com)
Bucharest University of Economic Studies
Abstract
The National Bank of Romania took a series of very ugly measures regarding the supervision of banks, not to repeat bankruptcy before 2000 (Bancorex, Bankcoop, Agricultural Bank, Religion Bank, Turkish-Romanian Bank, Romanian Bank of Scont etc.) . As a result of these measures, the financial crisis did not have significant negative effects, as in other countries, including in Europe where the financial system was more free, with fewer restrictions. In Romania, there was no need for state intervention to save strategically important banks considered to be big to fail, that is, their failure would have amplified the effects of the crisis.
Tracking a ranking in a set of risk indicators may be useful for determining the status of a bank, viewed individually and isolated, but this is not enough. Over 85% of the capital of the financial-banking market comes from outside Romania, and is exposed to the volatility in those markets. For example, banks in Greece, Austria, Italy, Portugal with difficulties in their country of origin have also transmitted these risks to their subsidiaries in Romania. The effect was not so vehement, because there was the Vienna agreement that regulated the capital withdrawals in Romania and the additional prudential supervision measures imposed by the NBR.
The impact also depends on the size of the actor in the market. For example, in Romania the top 5 banks have a market share of over 54%, which leads to the hypothesis that the difficulty of such a bank could create a greater turmoil in the Romanian financial system. Therefore, the National Bank of Romania imposes additional supervision measures on these banks.
Keywords: National Bank of Romania, stability, supervision, financial system, risk indicator
JEL Classification: E58, G21
