Historical Aspects, Traditions and Statistical Gaps.  
The German Economy versus the Romanian Economy

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Abstract
This paper reveals some historical aspects and some common traditions of German and Romanian economies, justifying some of the trends of contemporary decades underlying the statistical gap. The specific method used in this article is a statistical confrontation based on historical variables and statistical data, graphs emphasizing the abnormalities in evolution, etc. After a brief introduction, inside the major part of the structure of this paper some selected economic and social evolutions are presented together for both German and Romanian economies, somehow becoming the limits of the European Union construction. Few general gaps of the two economic marginal models as performance and cohesion are detailed during the historical and statistical investigation and the conclusions anticipates some expectations in the medium term dynamics of these economies. At the same time the article discusses Berlin’s position within EU and argues that Germany remains a selective continental hegemon, bent on securing national primacy and profit more than generating win-win solutions for its neighbours.

Key words: German & Romanian Economy, Confrontation, Historical Tradition, Statistical Gap.

JEL codes: C14, N13, N14, N24, N34, N44, N54, N64, N74, N84, N94.

1. Introduction
Since the first burgeoning community institutions after 1948, the following question persisted: To what extent is united Europe, or should it be, a single overall ensemble, or rather just the sum of its component parts? With every single crisis, whether we refer to the empty chair crisis of the 1960s, the Eurosclerosis of the 1980s, the tribulations of adopting a constitutional treaty, or the last recession, the followers of integralism as well as those of nationalism fuelled the debate with new generations of arguments.

For the smaller states of Europe, the EU road has always passed through the perceived need of adopting a successful model, embodied by one great power or another. For over 150 years, the modern Romanian state has moulded and remoulded the various possible scenarios. The elites and the public at large imagined either a Belgium at the gates of the Orient, or the austere Prussian
pattern, either the Italian corporatism of the 1930s or matching the French Hexagon and the Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic geographical basin.

Within the general framework we have just stated, the present paper is devoted to a comparison of the Romanian and German economies as a precondition for reflection on Berlin’s hegemony in Europe. The first part is rather anatomic in character, comparing the two nations in socio-economic terms; the second part turns to the physiology phenomenon: that is to say, how German hegemony in Europe affects the situation in Romania. The third part proposes a revision of the theory of hegemonic stability as a dialogue between Robert Gilpin and Robert W. Cox. The study concludes that, in order to restore the political and economic stability of the EU, Germany must behave like a true hegemon, not only as a *primus inter pares*, while the peripheral nations must in turn learn to maintain a responsible tax conduct. Germany’s economy, and with it the Romanian economy, have limiting positions in the European Union (EU), and within the usual hierarchy, they define the spectrum or the maximum variation range of the minimum and maximum performance in the area of the European Community. According to an essential principle of history, and implicitly of economic history, extracted from the essence of the experimental thinking of physics, that „*there is no reversal to original conditions*”, or in other words, there is no turning to the initial situation and the conditions that characterized every beginning, the paper relativizes the importance of the consequences of its approaches hinging on history and statistics, and proposes a brief insight into the sometimes similar, but often different past of the two economies and countries, in order to highlight some of their specific traditions, as well as their statistical gaps, in a historical or strictly evolutionary approach.

The temporal evolution is generally variable in keeping with the circumstances and cyclical, and rarely does the historical variable identify and present to the decision-makers in the field of economic policies, the information prerequisites and the historically similar statistical databases, or those having high equivalence. In practice, this development proves virtually irreversible, and the two economies, namely the German economy and our national economy, remain focused on completely different principles despite many similarities, as well as historical, economic and political alliances and adversity, against the background of the timeline of the last century and a half at least.

There are contrary general trends of the new millennium, which due to the marked lack of resources reduce dynamics and disparities, leading to convergences projected as in the EU, by a gradual return to the motivation of producing durable things, though in parallel with the sharp change of advanced technologies based on the expansion of the Internet, universalization and applied integration of biotechnologies and nanotechnologies, where new discoveries are expected. The new projects aimed at increasing the importance of unconventional energy sources, and the reduction of consumption and technological restructuring can always change the global economic hierarchy, the balance of payments and the international gaps.
2. Historical variable versus statistical variable and specific methodology

In the logic and perspective stated above, defining a European continental behaviour and knowing a few general traits and trends of development in different economies, through their purely social – and implicitly sociological – substance are essential, and they certainly have a major impact in the future evolution of regional hierarchies.

A historical tradition is inherited honestly and in a Shakespearean spirit (no legacy is so rich as honesty – which, transposed today would read: no inheritance from one generation to the next in any of the world’s economies, is more valuable than the honesty of self-knowledge), and it can be both improved and individualized, through continuous cultivation; the culture of honesty through historical and behavioural self-knowledge is the solution to many seemingly insoluble economic problems.

The relatively static conceptualization of the existence of specific statistical differences or gaps in relation to other economies enables a dynamic and profound approach, or an approach linked to the emerging trends in the development of an economy, implying real knowledge of some of the trends and characteristics of those economies compared, in parallel with the past; their behaviour and major deficiencies are proven as historical map obstacles.

The evolutionary abnormalities that increase the statistical gaps addressed in an economy involve identifying a duplicitous behaviour, and also a relative assessment of normality, which is recognized as difficult to define historically. The abnormalities that are statistically measured by gaps or differences outline a statistical variable from one economic and socio-cultural environment to another, while exploiting an individual “normality”, placed in a modal or median space of variation amplitude for the criterion evaluated. Abnormality, as a result of the gap, is realistically identified with a conceptualization in the sense of the deficit, i.e. failure, failing, lack of harmony, absence of norms and rules, omnipresence of failures. The treatment adapted to an economy with tendencies of evolving abnormality becomes similar to a simultaneously historical and medical treatment, where after describing and accepting the symptoms, the diagnosis will require solutions concerning a gradual loss of the consciousness of abnormality, marked by the statistical quantification of gaps or differences that tend towards ever smaller values, i.e. converging to zero, by changing the disorganized behaviour that affected, within socially acceptable limits, however, a natural dynamics, by cohesion in need for consensus, by avoiding those activities, attitudes and projective aspects falling within the boundaries of ambiguity or equivocalness, by validating a set of subsequent pragmatic and non-dichotomic developments. In this case, the evolving abnormality of an economy is treated almost like a neurosis, or even a psychosis in the case of lack of performance, but with processes of confidence expansion for the trend towards maximum performance, an outstanding
economic performance should not be treated, but rather motivated, valued and promoted.

Of the three standard ways of analytic confrontation or statistical benchmarking (Ragin, 1994), all have been relatively used in this article: a) qualitative research to study similarities (ending by drafting the summary profiles of Germany and Romania); b) comparative research proper (which also integrate the differences to explain the mechanisms operating in these two economies); c) quantitative research (focusing on a small number of variables investigated in the two economies, which are located at the two ends of economic performance in the EU). The resulting method focused on visible quantitative differences, addressed as statistical gaps or discrepancies, i.e. deviations from performance, a purely statistical method of confrontation focused on the amplitude of the deviation of a number of variables, by directly comparing the maximum performance behaviour with the minimum economic performance in the EU, improved by an original graphic presentation formula focused on the high visibility and clarity of charts drawn by means of the E-Views software package.

2.1. Discussion of some historical aspects, traditions and statistical gaps of the German and Romanian economies and results

A statistical confrontation of the performance values of the two extremes of the EU economy, the German economy at the pole of welfare, focusing solely on performance, consistency and honesty, and the economy of Romania, located in the extreme of lack of performance and honesty, at the European pole of poverty and extreme polarization, can only set out at the beginning of nation states, i.e. by historical aspects generating similarities that are initially unimaginable, and also striking differences.

The historical predispositions relating to the formation of national states in the two economies analysed in this paper are impressively similar in the nineteenth century, and largely explain their initial alliance in the Second World War, one century later, in the twentieth century. A certain stability of the national economy model, confronted and analysed statistically, i.e. focusing on the same farm determinations, reveal a high intensity in their tendency of state configuration, in the guise of Little Romania in 1859, and later by Greater Romania in 1918, broken and not reunited again even today, and, respectively, Little Germany in 1871, expanded through wars and divided in the post-war period, but reunited in 1990. Both these certainties and historical fluctuations of the initial territorial boundaries, and their historical evolution later in the Europe of today, hardly allow a firm decision, or at least an unhesitating answer to whether those historical moments are a reason for a laudatio of a victorious and reunited nation, or a reason for blaming a belligerent nation, always on the offensive for (re)unification.

An expert evaluation was made by many historians, but we only selected a few major references (Ropke, 1946; Alter 2000; Drăghicescu, 1907; Boia, 2002; 2010; 2011), who identify, in the two newly formed “small” countries, the seeds of political authoritarianism, economic militarism, major or minor but latent with
respect to territorial expansion, based on linguistic and ethnic criteria, towards those boundaries, of a social(ist), or feudal nationalism, an obvious cultural expansionism (with so different results, though), a kind of racism and anti-Semitism, original moderate, which became much more pronounced and more aggravating in point of impact near the Second World War.

Can this type of state making-up – in Eminescu’s expression: “from the Dniester to the Tisza”, which subsequently became a message of reunification, or the one defined by the lyrics of the German anthem Deutschland über alles, between the Meuse (Maas) and Memnel, and from the Adige to the Belt Strait, be a major similarity between the two countries, and even one that has marked for good their subsequent history and their economic development? Maps include not only relief and rivers, but also, and especially, communities of different ethnicities, who speak different languages or dialects, and in economic terms they can be transformed into resources, by means of people and traditions, but what was, and remained to this day, much more important than all the above, is the balance of Europe, redefined by the consensus of the birth and expansion for the EU to the geographical limits of Europe.

The same vision of Europe is interesting, and generating major differences, the vision of those states and economies – a Great(er) Germany was not possible, although it included fewer minorities than a Greater Romania (which existed, and still survives in the memory of most Romanians), but it would have become an economy, and too powerful a national state, which could have threatened at any time the balance of the continent, and destroyed European multiculturalism, declared to be EU’s main perennial wealth.

The two European countries, which have been thereby briefly analysed, initially had a similar democratic system, through in the light of the common compromise between their feudal heritage and the democratic liberal values, but while Romania remained captive to an exclusive competition between the Conservatives (then, the National Peasant Party) and the Liberals, without practically exceeding its initial limits, the German Social Democratic Party had already become in Germany, as early as 1912, the first party in the government.

Both economies were expansionist, antagonistically in the First World War, and as allies in the Second World War, being motivated by the idea of a great nation, based on legitimate language and ethnicity criteria, but while the essence of that expansion was generated by the border fairs between the three Romanian countries or principalities, and later a sociological school headed by Dimitrie Gusti would propose a traditionalist cultural state in Romania, against a background of protection of the traditional elements and customs in the peasant areas and villages investigated in their campaigns, preserving and even developing a feudal peasant civilization in a century of unprecedented urbanization of the developed countries, in Germany modern culture and scientific research already occupied the first place in the world between 1901 and 1918 (Boia, 2010): Germany had already got 17 Nobel prizes, i.e. as many as France, UK and USA together, feeding the expansionist ego and thus sufficiently motivating it.
Another common point is the tragedy of both economies in the post-war era, with both Germany and Romania being divided, and the worse thing is that Romania had been divided, following Germany’s agreement, as early as 1940, in order to push it into the alliance, which would later cause Romania, at the height of the German defensive, to leave the alliance, and even fight against Nazi Germany after 23 August 1944.

The analysis of the similarities and differences can by no means continue after that year, following the statistical principles of comparability, because up to 1990 there are two Germanies and a Romania divided into three areas, today’s Romania, (the Republic of) Moldova and Northern Bukovina, lying within the borders of today’s Ukraine (also including Chernivtsi, the place where Mihai Eminescu put the final touches to the literary Romanian language), and excluding Southern Dobrudja, which has never been a traditional Romanian territory throughout history. Even after 1990 the situations are not comparable, except for some strictly formal aspects: Germany’s reunification (re)generated the strongest economy in the EU, whereas economic and political transition, EU integration and the recession that began in 2008 gradually made Romania move to the extreme point of poverty in relation to the European average.

The German nation has demonstrated solidarity in its formation and national reunification, with a common language and culture as the unifying factor; by the end of the Second World War, Romania shared the same goal and proved a similar kind of conservatism by its traditions and customs. The interwar problem of Germany, born after the “death of the Holy Roman Empire” (as Imanuel Geiss said in 1997), or that of “the German wild challengers of European peace” (Ropke, 1946, p. 12) has long ceased to be a problem, being gradually replaced by Romania’s problem after its EU accession, extrapolated through the very complex “issue” of the Romas, the dimension of which was quite unimaginable a century ago. Romania’s problem does not seem different, in keeping with Drăghicescu’s appreciation, for “the Romanian nation, the fruit of the Daco-Roman communion and marriage, near the Carpathians and the Danube, is a child orphaned at birth, because his parents died on the very day he saw the light of day, so the Romanian people, born under such circumstances, as an orphan with no family, no relatives, left alone on the roads along which the barbarian invasions hurtled from Asia to Europe” (Drăghicescu, 1907).

If Germany began, in 1830, a process of state formation by the customs union, and thus designated its economy as the main argument of the national formation, and the issue of the 1990 reunification similarly imposed an economic understanding between East and West (in the “two plus four” form), in much the same way, Greater Romania appeared due to a limited understanding between the European countries winning World War One (where three of the “four” are to be found), while today it seems that the issue of Romania’s reunification – which would necessarily require a similar simultaneous triple agreement between the EU, Ukraine, and especially Russia – is no longer desirable or in order for anyone, ever, except for Romania.
After the Helsinki Treaty of 1 August 1975, by the effect of guaranteeing the inviolability of borders and boundaries then existing, any discussion about Northern Bukovina was banned for good, instead unification with (the Republic of) Moldova still remains a problematic issue, even after the latter’s entry into the EU. The essential difference that emerges from the above is that there are people in European history, and also economies, whose self-determination rights are different. The right to self-determination of the Germans is by no means the same as that of the Romanians.

There are German and Romanian feelings and traditions that have led their respective economies and states where they are today. If we take over and synthesize some of Dumitru Drăghicescu’s statements, we identify a major final contradiction when he points out that Romanians’ defects are due entirely to foreign influences (Slavs, Hungarians, Greeks, Turks) and the vicissitudes of history, that is to say Romanians are passive and individualistic, only mimicking respect for laws while skilfully avoiding them, with no respect for hierarchies, wanting to be their sole master, and remaining permanently duplicitous and not willing to complete the things started, unruly at work and fearing not so much poverty but rather the effort demanded by work, culminating with a label of character inferiority of the Romanians as a nation or people, which is offset by an intelligence superiority over other nations (including Germans).

All that seems to prevent completion of work or activities involving a “job well done”, while it gives the strange feeling of unfinished work, as Drăghicescu remarked in his book: “All kinds of Romanian activity – our science, literature, arts, agriculture, industry and trade – bear the mark of unfinishness… As our trade and agriculture and industry are unfinished, because trade is carried out by foreigners; our today’s villagers are neither better, nor worse farmers than the ancient Getae, and the industry comes in ready from the four parts of the world.”

What exactly constitutes the basic concern of oligarchies and hierarchies, especially political, becomes equally clear for Romania, in accordance with Drăghicescu: “The parliamentary regime, as it works in this country, has become a school of corruption.” (1907)

Perverted policies, a perverted political system or a perverted system of policy-makers can only corrupt pervert continuously, and “the whole household of our villagers is influenced by their spiritual manners. Indifference, idleness and recklessness can be half seen in the way they care for livestock and build their homes”, although “in terms of intelligence, Romanians were endowed by their creator, history, with a good amount of positive, luminous features, maybe as a reward for the lacks and shadows that it cast on the surface of our character… Whence the inferiority of Romanians’ character comes, from there comes the superiority of their intelligence”. Drăghicescu’s intuition regarding the degradation of consciousness (which shapes human character) and functioning, or survival, even at a very high level of intelligence, is now confirmed by recent research that support and validate the hypothesis that some important functional aspects of emotions can operate out of consciousness. (Haikonen, 2012)
A low level of honesty in the Romanian economy is confirmed by the very paradox that defines it, i.e. the Tullock paradox (the so-called punishment by ballot of politicians demanding bribe for economic facilities, brings about an increase in political bribery in the economic field, and even more spectacularly, an increase in the number of members of Parliament, which, since 9 December 2012, has increased from 470 to 588, far exceeding the needs of the economy and society as a whole). A standard of honesty that characterizes the German economy can be basically identified with an own paradox, which is actually called the “German paradox” (whereby a large and strong economy is ensured with wages that are low compared to the substantial results). For nearly one century, the German paradox generated the most competitive European economy, but as early as 2012, in the absence of regulations on minimum wages, more and more Germans started complaining about their low incomes, in stark contrast to their country’s economic performance and the German standard of honesty, which also tends to become slacker. In a German Euro area with the most low-wage employees (1/4 of the active labour force earn only 450 Euro per month on average, in full recession, according to an article in The Washington Post), the number of Germans aged between 30 and 59, who are not concerned and remain optimistic about their financial situation in their old age has fallen below 25% of the total.

The defining paradox of an economic and legislative type, or degenerating in relation to the standard of honesty, is given by the fact that economic laws and regulations, although apparently made by a body chosen by the people or by a more or less direct democratic system, when they must be applied by a body that is not elected by the people, by individuals, the degradation of the standard reappears axiomatically, increasing chaos and continuously lowering the overall level of honesty in Romania. The legal system is not independent of the economic activity, something separate from the individuals as origin and existence, something that can be born without cooperation, instead it needs the individuals and their cooperation, as well as their perpetual voluntary support to resolve the inherent conflicts. Corruption in the Romanian national economy gradually degrades the legal system, education, family, etc.

Alongside the classic German paradox, another paradox, which can only be defined for their economy, proved as important as the former one, and largely saved the German economy, even in full recession. The paradox of the “inverse elasticity of German products” is another explanation of their exceptional performance. The reliability of customer treatment and the very high level of the standard of honesty in the economy, the durability and the quality of German products generated a process that contradicts the laws of supply and demand: the higher the prices of the German products, the higher the demand; the top notch in the inverse elasticity ranking is held by German technology. The paradox of the “inverse elasticity of German products” is actually a paradox of the Veblen type (where high-income consumers buy luxury products as they become more expensive, and they can show off, very much like predators, their purchases as a continuous certification of the increase in their standards, or, in banking terms, in
their business standing), but a paradox in which the buyer has a higher income, but not necessarily exorbitant. To facilitate the understanding of the complex mechanisms underlying the formation and evolution of the standard of honesty in the two economies analysed, several statistical indicators were selected and commented, which were drawn from a uniform base, namely the economic database of the World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator). The two economies are presented, in a synthetic manner, in Tables 1 and 2, where the selected indicators were the per capita gross national income (GNI per capita, PPP – current $ million), the total population (Population – million inhabitants), the gross domestic product (GDP – current $ million), economic growth (GDP growth – annual %), GDP per employee (GDP per person employed – constant 1990 PPP $) and life expectancy at birth (Life expectancy at birth, total – years).

Table no. 1. Germany’s economy in keeping with the major indicators of the past decade

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<tr>
<td>GNI per capita, PPP (current $)</td>
<td>28120</td>
<td>29930</td>
<td>31470</td>
<td>34190</td>
<td>36150</td>
<td>37550</td>
<td>36500</td>
<td>38410</td>
<td>40190</td>
<td>41890</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population, mill inhabitants</td>
<td>82.534</td>
<td>82.516</td>
<td>82.469</td>
<td>82.376</td>
<td>82.266</td>
<td>82.110</td>
<td>81.902</td>
<td>81.777</td>
<td>81.798</td>
<td>80.426</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP (current mill $)</td>
<td>2423.8</td>
<td>2726.3</td>
<td>2766.3</td>
<td>2902.7</td>
<td>3323.8</td>
<td>3623.7</td>
<td>3298.6</td>
<td>3284.5</td>
<td>3600.8</td>
<td>3399.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP growth (annual %)</td>
<td>-0.375</td>
<td>1.161</td>
<td>0.685</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.269</td>
<td>1.083</td>
<td>-5.127</td>
<td>4.158</td>
<td>3.029</td>
<td>0.671</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP per person employed (constant 1990 PPP $)</td>
<td>4088</td>
<td>4125</td>
<td>4158</td>
<td>4288</td>
<td>4354</td>
<td>4349</td>
<td>4123</td>
<td>4256</td>
<td>4327</td>
<td>43243</td>
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<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth (years)</td>
<td>78.38</td>
<td>78.68</td>
<td>78.93</td>
<td>79.13</td>
<td>79.53</td>
<td>79.74</td>
<td>79.64</td>
<td>79.99</td>
<td>80.74</td>
<td>81</td>
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Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator

Table no. 2. Romanian economy in keeping with the major indicators of the past decade

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<tr>
<td>GNI per capita, PPP (current $)</td>
<td>7590</td>
<td>8550</td>
<td>9280</td>
<td>10860</td>
<td>12650</td>
<td>14550</td>
<td>14440</td>
<td>14600</td>
<td>15780</td>
<td>16310</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP (current mill $)</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>75.48</td>
<td>98.91</td>
<td>122.64</td>
<td>169.28</td>
<td>204.34</td>
<td>164.35</td>
<td>164.79</td>
<td>182.61</td>
<td>169.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP growth (annual %)</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>-6.6</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP per person employed (constant 1990 PPP $)</td>
<td>8352</td>
<td>9215</td>
<td>9746</td>
<td>10442</td>
<td>11081</td>
<td>11872</td>
<td>11291</td>
<td>11281</td>
<td>11452</td>
<td>11584</td>
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<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth (years)</td>
<td>71.31</td>
<td>71.59</td>
<td>71.88</td>
<td>72.16</td>
<td>72.56</td>
<td>72.56</td>
<td>73.30</td>
<td>73.46</td>
<td>74.51</td>
<td>74.69</td>
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Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator

There is an apparent homogeneity of a number of indicators that do not betray very big differences between the two extremes of the EU economy, if one analyses the downward population dynamics or the oscillations of economic growth. Apparently, the ratio GNI per capita has also somewhat improved, a convergence trend seems to exist for Romania, and the reduction from 3.7 to 2.6.
appears as a seemingly positive thing, but if it comes to expressing GNI in $ compared to purchasing power parity (PPP), it becomes less credible, and even criticisable, in view of the completely different consumption baskets of the typical households that generated the parity or exchange rate.

With a GDP of 20-40 times higher in level, but with a ratio that is halved, the trends in compensating the gaps seem favourable for the Romanian economy, relatively confirmed even by the trend in life expectancy, which is approaching, from a gap of 7 years, to one of only 6 years over a decade, but this means that we can identify a distance of at least 60 years between the two economies.

There are structural elements that demonstrate that this gap is even larger share, from the share of the urban population, which is 74% in Germany and only 53% in Romania, from the external debt which is about 1/3 of Romania’s exports, while in the German economy it does not actually exist, and the gross saving level as percentage of GDP is much higher in the behaviour typical of the German economy (as can be seen from Table 3).

### Table no. 3. The German and Romanian evolution of gross savings as a percentage of GDP, after 2003

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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
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Addressing the degree of attractiveness of the economies by the phenomenon of migration, the balance is in favour of immigrants in Germany, where last year a net number of 549,998 people entered, while Romania was left by a net number of 44,999 inhabitants. Investment attractiveness, specifically just foreign direct investment (FDI) has steadily fallen in the Romanian economy after its historic performance in 2006, and especially 2007, when it reached a peak of $13,849 billion, approaching Germany by less than three billion (compared to 16,531 billion FDI in Germany); after the global recession the ratio is over 20 times higher for incoming FDI in Germany as compared to Romania ($42,787 billion in 2010 and $27,221 billion in 2011, compared with about 2.5 billion and 1.3 billion, respectively).

However, all that statistical information fails to reveal the major difference concerning the gap between the two economies, and the abnormality of the Romanian economy. To do that in-depth indicators are required, and more than that, a special methodology, which such a small scope paper as the present article, cannot certainly develop.

The selection, having the nature of an illustration, only chose four indicators with relevance capacity for the major statistical gaps between the two economies (the indicators in Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4):
Figure no. 1. Employment of vulnerable labour force* as a percentage of total employment

Data source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator

*Note: Vulnerable labour force consists of unpaid family workers and self-employed workers

Figure no. 2. Value gaps between aggregate fees paid for the use of intellectual property in keeping with the balance of payments in million dollars

Data source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
Figure no. 3. Dropout level in primary and secondary education, and the target for 2020

Data source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator

Figure no. 4. The percentage of higher education graduates (tertiary cycle completed for persons aged 30 to 34 years), and the target for 2020

Data source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
The four indicators reflect the gaps either by mere visual assessment of the differences in level of the columns in the charts, or directly or explicitly by determining the balance or actual gap (Fig 2) between each parameter in an economy and were chosen because they render the essential concept of economic performance with reference to individuals in Table 3, to companies in Figure 1, and to both companies and institutions in figure 2. However, the contribution of tertiary education and the level of dropout are defining medium-term factors in predicting gap trends. If we add another complex type indicator bringing together both institutional involvement and involvement of companies, and describing the duration of resolving an insolvency, the gap becomes much more obvious between the integrity and moral-economic probity of the two economies: the average time in years devoted to resolving insolvency was one to two years in Germany, and 3.3 years in Romania.

Everywhere in the EU, and implicitly in Germany and Romania, there is, or has been formed (be it only in the backstage) a usually heterogeneous governing class, bringing together governmental and non-governmental elites, in the opinion of Italian statistician Vilfredo Pareto, the famous author of the demonstration of optimum welfare distribution, etc. Raymond Aron divides the quality of this class in comparison to the balance it identifies between inventiveness and innovation and stability and conservatism, and if Pareto lays stress on specific and traditional notions such as feelings and emotions (e.g. feelings and emotions characteristic of, or specific to Germans and Romanians, respectively) and the derivations with a balancing role (true indications of the forces acting with a view to ensuring socio-economic balance), Raymond Aron also highlights the importance of economic and social instincts, and the of the behaviours specific to each single economy.

2.2. Some transitional remarks

The German economic behaviour has been, for nearly half a century, focused on a paradox of continuously manifested effort and sustainable competitiveness, something built quietly, which was expressed by Schopenhauer as “silence is the loudest cry”. Meanwhile, the Romanian economy alternatively generated an excessively firm behaviour, or a strange one, a coherent behaviour or a syncopated one, focused on the intention to give a major sense to the national economy, which was virtually never identified – so, to paraphrase Seneca, “it is not the man who goes faster that will not arrive the first, but rather the man who knows where he goes”. The end in today’s EU space is different, identifying a completely reunified Germany, though not a Romania at least partially reunited with Moldova, in a common natural body.

The final major remark involves the construction of the European Union, which includes, among other things, the two models of real economies placed in extreme or marginal positions, and summarizes some expectations related to honesty, in accordance with the history of the traditions and gaps commented on in this paper. Any political system and any economy in which individuals are sacrificed in favour of society become tyrannical, and if they also subject freedom
to systematic aggression, they will also acquire features of brutality and total lack of humanity.

A German economy that praised or glorified social well-being at the expense of the individual, or an economy of a Romanian type that always looked for the same mean variant for the people whose welfare is towed, with some non-incentive echoes for those doing the towing, thus causing more and more serious problems in the medium and long term. The German economy, which used to have the largest share of social expenditure in GDP in the EU, appears to be rethinking a new Rhine model, while in the Romanian economy the fundamental institution of private property is relatively sacrificed and concealed. The German economy has tightened immigration laws, whereas the Romanian economy was and still is an “exporter” of specialists, and even high standard experts, who are sent to Germany, too. It is true that the German economy, where there was the worst damage to tackle in the post-war era, recovered more quickly, and the rapid economic recovery was largely due to economic honesty, but one should not overlook the Marshall Plan, which had a fundamental role in it. In the post-war period, the Romanian economy unfortunately lost a workforce characterized by moral spirit, which continuously degraded its probity, and in order to change its position in the EU Romania will have to start from the need to rebuild it entirely, boosting the energy of a new, overwhelmingly honest generation.

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